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Abstract: Systemic risk refers to the risk of financial system 
breakdown due to linkages between institutions. This risk cannot be 
assessed by looking at how individual institutions manage risks but 
instead requires a full understanding of how the system as a whole 
operates. At present, the data available to central banks and financial 
regulators are not at all adequate for the task of assessing systemic 
risk and the new European Systemic Risk Board needs to address 
this issue. There is a lot of exciting ongoing research devoted to 
measuring systemic risk and providing signals to regulators as to 
when and where they should intervene. However, the tools being 
developed are still limited in their usefulness. More pressing than the 
development of these tools is the development and implementation of 
policy measures to make the financial system more robust. These 
measures should include higher capital ratios, limits on non-core 
funding and redesigning financial systems to be less complex. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This is a briefing paper delivered by the author, in his role as a member of an Expert Panel of advisors, to 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in relation to its Monetary 
Dialogue with the European Central Bank. 1. The Challenge Posed by Systemic Risk 
 
The financial crisis of the past few years and, in particular, the worldwide 
panic that accompanied the fall of Lehman Brothers in September of last 
year, has come as quite a shock to governments and financial regulators 
around the world. During the preceding years, there had been a growing 
belief that financial institutions were becoming increasingly sophisticated in 
their management of risks and that these practices, combined with the 
growth of securitisation, were helping to make the financial system more 
stable.  That the financial crisis engulfed the whole global financial system, 
including banks that had conformed to perceived best practices in risk 
management, showed that this belief was ill-founded. 
 
There is now a widespread recognition that existing structures of financial 
regulation and monitoring are inadequate and this has lead to a flurry of 
activity aimed at putting new structures in place that will make our financial 
system more stable. In Europe, much of the responsibility for ensuring the 
safety of the system will fall on the new macro-prudential body, the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). 
 
The ESRB faces many challenges. To start with, there is no clearly agreed 
definition of systemic risk nor is there a consistent set of well-developed 
tools with which regulators can measure and monitor such risk. In this paper, 
I will discuss these two issues---the definition of systemic risk and the tools 
that can be used to measure it---and then focus on the strategies that can be 
used to make the financial system less vulnerable to systemic breakdown in 
the future.  
2. 2. The Nature of Systemic Risk 
 
2.1 The IMF-BIS-FSB Definition 
 
There are many different definitions of systemic risk. Perhaps the most 
relevant for the purposes of current debate is that provided by a recent 
briefing paper prepared for the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors by the 
International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements and the 
Financial Stability Board.
2 This paper defines systemic risk as 
 
a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment 
of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have 
serious negative consequences for the real economy.  
 
The briefing paper then discusses the various criteria relating to whether an 
institution should be judged systemically important or not. 
 
In my opinion, this definition of systemic risk focuses too much on 
outcomes, on what goes wrong in a financial crisis. A better definition would 
focus on what leads the system as a whole to become unstable. In addition, I 
suspect that focusing a lot of attention on defining systemically important 
institutions (and then focusing regulation heavily on these institutions) is 
perhaps not the best way to think about tackling the systemic risk problem. 
 
To explain what I mean by these points, consider the following example. 
                                                 
2 IMF, BIS, FSB (2009). 2.2 A Simple Example 
 
Consider the case of three banks, imaginatively named A, B, C.  Their 
balance sheets are described below.  
 
Bank A 
Assets  Liabilities   
Loans to Customers  100  Retail Deposits  130 
Loans to B  30  Borrowing from B  30 
Loans to C  30  Borrowing from C  30 
Other Securities  40  Equity Capital  10 
Total 200    200 
 
Bank B 
Assets  Liabilities   
Loans to Customers  100  Retail Deposits  130 
Loans to A  30  Borrowing from A  30 
Loans to C  30  Borrowing from C  30 
Other Securities  40  Equity Capital  10 
Total 200    200 
 
Bank C 
Assets  Liabilities   
Loans to Customers  100  Retail Deposits  130 
Loans to A  30  Borrowing from A  30 
Loans to B  30  Borrowing from B  30 
Other Securities  40  Equity Capital  10 
Total 200    200 
 
 
In this example, the banks are completely symmetric, in that each of them 
has €130 in deposits, each has borrowings from the two other banks and 
each has loans out to the other banks. (One may ask why these banks both 
borrow from and lend to each other. One reason is maturity transformation. 
For instance, Bank A may be borrowing short term and lending long term.)   
Now suppose that Bank A makes losses of €40 on its loans. This wipes out 
its equity capital. In addition, it has a shortfall of €30 when it comes to 
meeting its liabilities. Assuming that there is no intervention so that the bank 
is wound up and assuming that depositors are fully protected, the banks is 
only able to pay back half of its loans to Banks B and C. Banks B and C now 
sustain losses of €15 each on their assets and this wipes out all of their 
equity capital. 
 
In this example, losses at a single bank end up bringing down all the other 
banks. This type of stylized “domino” example, in which a single bank 
failure triggers further failures, helps to illustrate a useful point. In this 
example, all the banks are identical, so none could be judged as particularly 
more systemic than the others. What brings down this system isn’t the fact 
that the original bank in trouble was particularly special, but the 
interconnections in the system between the various banks.  
 
2.3 Beyond the Domino Model 
 
In the basic example, Bank A made a loss of €40 and this brought down the 
whole banking system because the system only had equity capital of €30. No 
additional losses occurred: For instance, at each bank, the value of the other 
securities remained at €40 throughout this crisis that brought each of them 
down.  
 
In practice, this type of situation, in which one bank makes a catastrophic 
loss that brings down the whole system, is very unlikely to ever occur. Empirical studies that have simulated the interlinkages between banks have 
generally concluded that the probability of one domino bringing down the 
whole system is very small.
3
 
And yet systemic crises do happen. To understand why requires introducing 
some additional elements. In reality, the process triggering systemic risk is 
more likely to look something like the following:  
 
•  Bank A makes a loss of €5 on its loan book, halving its equity capital 
to €5. 
 
•  Bank A is now faced with a big increase in its leverage ratio—the 
ratio of its assets to its equity capital—from 20 (200/10) to 39 (195/5), 
most likely putting it either close to or below its capital adequacy 
requirement. 
  
•  This forces Bank A to start selling some of its securities. These were 
originally worth €40 but because it has to get rid of them in a firesale, 
the bank sells half of them and only recoups €18. The remaining 
assets are also marked to market as being worth €18. These events 
reduce Bank A’s equity capital to €1. 
 
•  Banks B and C are now hit with two problems. Because Bank A has 
been selling its securities in a firesale, the value of their security 
holdings has also fallen to €36, reducing their equity capital to €6. 
                                                 
3 Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) was one such study using UK data. They concluded: “the UK 
banking system appears to be very stable. In particular, the likelihood of domino effects is very low.” Needing to shrink their balance sheets and worried about Bank A’s 
solvency, they decide not to roll over their loans to Bank A. 
 
•  Bank A now needs to come up with the money to pay off the other 
banks. But with its equity almost wiped out and the value of its 
securities falling, it fails to do so. 
 
•  Banks B and C now start to sustain losses on their loans to Bank A 
and this combines with the losses on their securities to leave them as 
vulnerable as Bank A was after it made its initial loan losses. 
 
In this example, a relatively small loan loss for one bank (that is, small 
relative to the total equity capital of the system) ends up placing the whole 
financial system in trouble.
4 This occurs not just because the banks in the 
system are interconnected but because defensive actions by individual 
banks, designed to protect their best interests, end up destabilising the 
system.  
 
Worth noting here are two features of this financial system that contributed 
to its demise: 
 
•  Had the banks had higher capital levels, the original loan losses of 
Bank A would have been less likely to trigger the subsequent chain 
reaction. 
 
                                                 
4 See Morris and Shin (2008) for an accessible discussion of the processes described here. •  If the maturity of interbank lending had been long term, then decisions 
to not renew loans would not have had much effect. In reality, many 
of the institutions that got in to trouble in recent years obtained much 
of their funding from short-term repo markets. Once these banks got 
in to trouble, the haircuts associated with this funding rose and in 
some cases their repo funding dried up altogether. 
 
2.4 A Different Definition 
 
In light of these examples, I will offer another definition. Systemic risk 
refers to the risk of financial system breakdown due to linkages between 
institutions. This risk cannot be assessed by looking at how individual 
institutions manage risks but instead requires a full understanding of how the 
system as a whole operates. Indeed, the mechanisms that generate systemic 
risk often relate to individual institutions taking decisions in the interests of 
their own prudent risk management. 
 
3. Measuring and Monitoring Systemic Risk 
 
The stylized banking crisis discussed above can be broken in to three phases. 
First, there are large losses on loans or securities at one or a number of 
banks, often stemming from the collapse of an asset price bubble. Second, 
the weakness in one part of the banking system has an effect on other 
financial institutions that are connected to it. Third, the financial distress 
leads to a set of feedbacks via deleveraging, asset fire-sales, increased 
haircuts and other mechanisms.  
I will discuss the practical tools that central banks and financial regulators 
can use to predict, model and deal with systemic risk by taking these three 
elements in turn. 
 
3.1 Macro Analysis: Early Warning Systems 
 
The seeds of financial crisis are usually sown during a boom period in which 
asset prices rise beyond historical yardsticks and participants in the financial 
system believe that risk levels are low. Only when it is too late do people 
realise that asset prices are going to crash, leading to defaults and financial 
instability. As Andrew Crockett has put it, risk is perhaps best seen as 
“increasing during upswings, as financial imbalances build up, and 
materialising in recessions.”
 5  In many cases, the asset price booms are 
driven by loose monetary policy and easy credit, often driven by financial 
innovation or deregulation. 
 
This raises an obvious question. Why can’t central banks and regulators use 
macroeconomic data to design “early warning” indicators? This is a 
particularly important issue for the ESRB because it seems unlikely to have 
significant direct powers, so much of its influence may rest on its ability to 
issue warnings to member states or financial institutions. 
 
A number of researchers have worked on early warning systems for financial 
crises. A recent ECB working paper by Alessi and Detken (2009) is a 
particularly good example of this kind of work. Unfortunately, it does not 
                                                 
5 Crockett (2000). yet appear that the research on early warning systems has reached the stage 
where one could be confident that it can have a significant influence on 
policy formulation.  
 
A key problem with the early warning approach is that it can tend to deliver 
“false alarms” which can discredit the methodology, with its practitioners 
seen as “boys and girls who cry wolf.” However, when the indictors are 
adapted to keep the incidence of false positives, the approach then regularly 
fails to predict crises. Alessi and Detken report that their preferred indicator 
“did not allow issuing a warning signal in 40% of quarters followed by a 
costly boom/bust cycle and provided false alarms in 20% of quarters not 
followed by a costly boom/bust cycle.” With a track record of this sort, early 
warning indicators can be dismissed pretty easily by a policy maker who has 
been convinced by financial markets that “this time is different”. 
 
“This Time Is Different” is, of course, the title of a recent book on eight 
hundred years of financial crises by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff 
(2009). Reinhart and Rogoff discuss early warning signals, arguing that: 
 
The greatest barrier to success is the well-entrenched tendency of policy-
makers and market participants to treat the signals as irrelevant archaic 
residuals of an out-of-date framework, assuming that old rules of valuation 
no longer apply. If the past we have studied in this book is any guide, these 
signals will be dismissed more often than not. 
 
This negative assessment of early warning signals should not be taken as a 
dismissal of the usefulness of this research. It may be that such indicators will play a useful role in heading off future crises. And it is, of course, 
possible that warnings based on these approaches will have more weight 
coming from a European Systemic Risk Board than they have had in the 
past. However, past experience suggests we cannot rely on early warnings, 
so we need to think about how to protect the financial system from 
meltdown when future asset price bubbles are popped. 
 
3.2 Mapping the Financial System 
 
Accepting that large defaults and problems at individual banks probably 
cannot be prevented from occurring, the ideal empirical tool for policy 
analysis would be a real-world model of the financial system along the lines 
of our Bank A-B-C example.  This model could then be simulated regularly 
and used for realistic scenario analysis. Unfortunately, despite widespread 
agreement on the desirability of an empirical model of the inter-linkages in 
the financial system, there are many data problems that make such analysis 
difficult. 
 
In a recent wide-ranging speech, ECB Executive Board member Lorenzo 
Bini-Smaghi emphasised the need to use firm-level data to assess systemic 
risk in this fashion but noted that the “the information available to bodies 
entrusted with financial stability functions but without a supervisory 
mandate is far from satisfactory.” 
 
I would go somewhat farther than this in relation to the question of data 
availability. Even among institutions with a supervisory mandate, there are many shortages of data. The following is an incomplete list of data 
shortages: 
 
1.  Existing statistical reporting to central banks does not always provide 
the full picture in relation to the consolidated assets and liabilities of 
large and complex financial institutions, including off-balance sheet 
activities.  
 
2.  While central banks can request information on interbank liabilities, 
such data does not appear to part of current consolidated statistical 
reporting by banks. Existing research employing network analysis—
modelling the full set of interactions between all institutions in the 
system—has used publicly reported totals for interbank borrowing and 
lending and then applied educated guesses about the full matrix of 
interbank positions.
6 Such data usually come from annual or quarterly 
reports, so they cannot be used to map the financial system on a daily 
or weekly basis. 
 
3.  Information about assets on the trading books of financial institutions 
and the nature of exposures due to derivative instruments is often 
limited. Typically, book and market values are only reported 
quarterly. A roughly similar situation exists regarding counterparty 
risk exposures. Both of these types of exposure can change very 
rapidly.  
 
                                                 
6 Examples include Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) and Aikman et al (2009). 4.  There is very little available information on the interactions between 
non-regulated entities, such as hedge funds, and the rest of the 
financial system. 
 
5.  There are huge data gaps in relation to cross-border financial 
exposures, a point discussed in a recent briefing paper for the G20 
prepared by the IMF and Financial Stability Board.
7 
 
These examples make it clear that bodies charged with monitoring systemic 
risk face significant challenges in terms of data collection. The ESRB should 
address these challenges by:  
 
•  Taking the lead in setting out a common framework within Europe for 
regular (no less than monthly) collection of information relevant for 
assessing systemic risk, including detailed data on assets and 
liabilities, maturity profile, major exposures, as well as responses to 
scenario analysis relating to macroeconomic shocks.  
 
•  Ensuring that this framework extends beyond banks to other types of 
financial institutions. AIG, it should be recalled, was not a bank but 
turned out to be the perhaps the biggest single source of systemic risk 
in the global financial system. 
 
•  Insisting that these data are not simply collected in isolation but are 
centralised for analysis at the ESRB. In turn, the ESRB should co-
                                                 
7 IMF, FSB (2009). operate with the IMF and the BIS to allow for global sharing of data 
for systemic risk analysis. This idea of an international “credit 
register” has been recommended by the De Larosiere report. 
 
Addressing all of these difficulties represents an enormous challenge. MIT’s 
Andrew Lo has likened the effort required to produce useful data for 
systemic risk analysis to the work done in creating national accounts, which 
facilitated the development of modern macroeconomics.
8  One of the 
problems associated with this effort will be sorting out the legal issues 
associated with handling highly confidential information and sharing it 
across multiple agencies in multiple countries. Another issue brought into 
focus during the crisis is that some institutions had difficulty in aggregating 
consolidated risk exposures across their group structure of companies.   
 
While the scale of the task in relation to data collection is considerable, it 
should not be insurmountable. Most of the information that a systemic risk 
regulator would require from financial institutions should be accessible from 
their risk management system. As such, an additional benefit from the data 
collection exercise is that it may help to diagnose institutions with 
inadequate risk controls. 
 
3.3. Modelling Financial Distress 
 
The shortage of adequate data with which to adequately map the financial 
system means that attempts to empirically model the system via “network 
analysis” are unlikely to give us more than illustrative simulation tools. 
                                                 
8 Lo (2009). However, even if we had a perfect dataset, there are serious limits to how far 
this type of network analysis can get us in assessing systemic risk. 
 
As I noted above, standard analyses of the linkages between banks tend to 
suggest that the domino effect is unlikely to ever topple a financial system.  
However, these analyses assume that the only loss in asset value stems from 
the initial loss by the first domino bank, with all other asset values remaining 
the same. The global financial crisis has taught us that reality looks more 
like our second example above, where banks take defensive actions in 
response to an initial shock and these actions result in fire-sales that further 
reduce asset values. 
 
Some important work on extending network analysis is being done at the 
Bank of England via the development of their Risk Assessment Model for 
Systemic Institutions (RAMSI). As far as I know, the model is the first of its 
kind to realistically integrate macroeconomic shocks and their effects on 
credit losses. In addition, it contains a firesale mechanism, so that prices of 
particular types of assets depend negatively on the quantity of those assets 
being sold. It also contains a mechanism for modelling the process whereby 
a bank’s access to certain funding markets can close if its conditions worsen. 
 
This is very exciting work and I’m sure that the ESRB will fully engage in 
further developing this type of analysis. Models like RAMSI are likely to be 
highly valuable simulation tools for understanding systemic risk. However, 
without sufficiently detailed and timely data, these models may still be of 
limited usefulness in telling systemic risk regulators when and how to 
intervene.   
Moreover, it will never be possible to fully simulate how financial crises will 
play out. Even in the simple example above, there were are a number of 
decisions that would be very difficult to model in an empirical manner, such 
as whether Bank A could have raised outside equity capital after its losses 
and the exact point at which the other banks decided to pull their funding 
from it. It simply may not be possible to reduce the full complexity of 
financial crises to an econometric model. 
 
3.4 Modelling Linkages with Market Data 
 
A final source of information for assessing systemic risk is market data. For 
instance, regulators traditionally use the Value at Risk indicator to assess the 
riskiness of a bank’s portfolio: This measure describes the level of asset 
returns such that with some chosen probability j, the bank’s asset returns 
should be above this level. However, this doesn’t tell us much about what 
happens to other institutions when this bank reaches this VaR level of asset 
returns.  
 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) suggest a method for estimating the Value 
at Risk of the whole financial system conditional on a portfolio of specific 
institution being at its Value at Risk level. They suggest that this measure 
gives us an idea of how individual institutions may contribute to aggregate 
systemic risk. It could be argued, however, that this is a very specific 
measure of systemic risk. For instance, Adrian and Brunnermeier note that if 
a large “systemic” institution is split into n identical clones, the Co-VaR of 
the large institution is exactly the same as the CoVaRs of the n clones. In reality, however, systemic risk regulators are likely to feel that none of the n 
clones are quite as systemic as the large institution. Still, the CoVar measure 
is useful in the sense that it gives a sense of how multiple institutions 
adopting the same trading strategy can contribute to systemic risk. 
 
The default probabilities implied in Credit Default Swap prices are also 
useful market data. The IMF’s April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report 
shows how Adrian and Brunnermeier’s methodology can be used to model 
the extent to which a default at one institution is likely to trigger other 
defaults.
9  The IMF analysis shows the CDS data suggested that both AIG 
and Lehmans were extremely sensitive in 2008 to defaults at a number of 
other institutions. One drawback of these measures is that they rely on the 
market to assess the risk associated with individual institutions. However, 
markets tend to underestimate risks prior to a crisis which may limit the 
usefulness of these measures.  
 
3.5 Conclusions on Measuring and Monitoring Systemic Risk 
 
I will draw a few conclusions from the above discussion. 
 
First, while the failure of some institutions is more likely to trigger a 
systemic financial crisis than others, preventing future crises will require 
more than simply identifying “systemic institutions” and regulating them 
closely. It is likely that many financial institutions will fit any useful 
definition of systemic. And the failure of institutions that may not appear to 
be systemic may still cause severe stress for the financial system if their 
                                                 
9 See pages 86 to 90 of IMF (2009). failure triggers contagion effects, forced assets sales, and withdrawals of 
funding from other institutions. 
 
Second, a full understanding of systemic risk requires a detailed 
understanding of the various linkages between financial institutions. 
Currently, the data collected by central banks and financial institutions falls 
well short of what is required to adequately assess systemic risk. Ideally, 
over time, systemic risk regulators can develop realistic models that can be 
used to assess increases over time in the potential for a meltdown in the 
financial system and intervene accordingly. However, it appears that we are 
currently some distance short of this ideal. An analogy from 
macroeconomics may be useful. Systemic risk policy is likely to feature 
roles for both rules and discretion. Network models may be very helpful in 
designing better rules and in assessing the impact of discretionary judgement 
calls but discretionary actions will remain important.
10
 
Third, research on developing macroeconomic early warning indicators and 
proxies for systemic risk based on market data is to be welcomed. However, 
such research will never be foolproof and should be seen as part of a process 
of developing a range of systemic risk indicators. 
 
4. Containing Systemic Risk 
 
It is clear that there is much that can be done by the new ESRB and other 
agencies to better measure systemic risk. But we cannot rely on these 
                                                 
10 See Bank of England (2009) for a discussion of this idea. initiatives to prevent systemic breakdowns from occurring again. More 
needs to be done. Specifically, we need to change the structure of the 
financial system to be more robust. 
 
Here are five initiatives that can be taken to reduce the problem of systemic 
risk. 
 
1.  Higher Capital Ratios: In our theoretical examples above, the first 
“domino” bank would not have collapsed had it held sufficient capital. 
In this sense, while not sufficient, actions to improve the safety of 
individual institutions are a necessary condition for lowering systemic 
risk. The G20 has agreed that capital ratios must be increased. That’s 
the easy part. The hard part will be deciding over the next year or so 
what these higher required ratios should be and at what point the costs 
associated with higher capital ratios (due to more expensive capital 
and less efficient financial intermediation) start to prevail. 
 
2.  Core Liquidity Ratios: Our examples also showed how reliance by 
financial institutions on short-term sources of funding, such as the 
repo market, contributed to systemic risk. The G20’s Pittsburgh 
communiqué called for strengthened liquidity requirements. A strict 
way to enforce this would be via Lord Turner’s recommendation of a 
minimum required ratio of “core funding” (defined as deposits plus 
certain types of longer funding) to total liabilities.  
 
3.  New Infrastructure: Much of the systemic risk problem stems from 
the complex nature of interactions between financial institutions. Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England has argued that governments 
should work to simplify the structure of the global financial network.
11 
For example, governments could set up a central counterparty for 
interbank lending, which would simplify the system to a basic hub-
and-spoke structure and reduce the potential for spillovers from the 
failure of an individual institution. Requiring private centralised 
counterparties could also help to simplify and stabilise complex 
markets such as those for Credit Default Swaps. 
 
4.  Addressing Too Big to Fail:  Large financial institutions—those most 
likely to trigger a systemic financial crisis—should be required to hold 
higher capital levels. 
  
5.  Resolution Framework: The ESRB should take the lead in 
establishing an agreed EU-wide resolution framework for dealing with 
troubled banks. This framework needs to ensure financial stability but 
should also provide a credible commitment that providers of risk 
capital to failed banks should lose their money. Such a framework 
should come with sanctions for countries that fail to comply with it. 
 
Ultimately, it should be accepted that all financial systems are subject to 
periods of financial instability. However, the recent crisis has taught us 
many lessons about the features of the current global financial system that 
have made it particularly vulnerable to a system-wide failure. The 
development of new data sources and tools to monitor systemic risk will 
                                                 
11 Haldane (2009). play an important role in the preventing future crises. But redesigning the 





Adrian, Tobias and Markus Brunnermeier (2009). CoVar, Princeton 
University. 
 
Aikman, David and others (2009). Funding liquidity risk in a quantitative 
model of systemic stability, Bank of England, Working Paper No. 372. 
 
Alessi, Lucia and Carsten Detken (2009). “Real Time” Early Warning 
Indicators for Costly Asset Price Boom/Bust Cycles: A Role for Global 
Liquidity. ECB Working Paper No. 1039. 
 
Bank of England (2009). The Role of Macroprudential Policy. 
 
Bini Smaghi, Lorenzo. (2009). Macro-prudential Supervision. Speech to 
CEPR/ESI Conference on “Financial Supervision in an Uncertain World” 
September 25, 2009. 
 
Crockett, Andrew (2000). Marrying the micro- and macro-prudential 
dimensions of financial stability, Bank for International Settlements, 
www.bis.org/review/rr000921b.pdf. 
 
Elsinger, Helmut, Alfred Lehar and Martin Summer (2006). “Using Market 
Information for Banking System Risk Assessment”, International Journal of 
Central Banking, March. 
 
Haldane, Andrew (2009). Rethinking the Financial Network, Speech 
delivered at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam, April 2009. 
 
IMF (2009). Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009. 
 
IMF, BIS, FSB (2009). Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of 
Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, 
Briefing Paper for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 
October 28, 2009.  
IMF, FSB (2009). The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps, Briefing 
Paper for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, October 
29, 2009. 
 
Lo, Andrew (2009). The Feasibility of Systemic Risk Measurement, Written 
Testimony Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Financial 
Services Committee, October 19. 
 
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (2008). “Financial Regulation in a 
System Context”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall Edition. 
 
Renihart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff (2009). This Time Is Different: Eight 
Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press. 
 
Turner, Adair (2009). The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the 
Global Banking Crisis. UK Financial Services Authority: March 2009. 